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3Abstract 
 This paper focuses on the struggles that infertile women face to achieve motherhood 
because their rights are underrepresented in the American court system.  It specifically centers on 
how the process of in vitro fertilization (IVF) helps infertile women conceive children, but then 
details the problems that increasing technology now causes for these women after they freeze 
embryos and then divorce.  Because the courts of only four states have determined who gets 
custody of these embryos after a divorce, and because the divorce rate and the number of couples 
utilizing IVF are increasing, future states will likely be forced to answer the same question in the 
future.  Until now, the rights of female participants wishing to utilize the frozen embryos have 
not been adequately protected or recognized. 
 This paper argues that the female participant deserves full custody of IVF produced 
cryogenically preserved embryos after a divorce, because it is the only feasible way for her to 
overcome her disability of infertility and conceive children who are genetically related to her.   
Part I of this paper explains the detailed process and technique of IVF that helps women 
overcome their disability of infertility, including the various benefits and risks that the women 
face.  Next, Part II analyzes the case law on this topic and explains the holdings and reasonings 
of the courts that have already tackled this issue and have failed to protect the infertile women’s 
rights.  Lastly, Part III explains why future decisions should grant custody of the cryogenically 
preserved embryos to women because of their “sweat equity” in the process and because these 
embryos provide the best chance for these infertile women to become mothers. 
 
4Introduction  
 Over the past two decades, tens of thousands of children have been born through in vitro 
fertilization (“IVF”), “the best known of several methods of assisted reproduction,” making it 
possible for otherwise infertile women and their husbands to conceive children who are 
genetically related to them.1 Because technology enables these couples to cryogenically 
preserve2 any unused embryos for future use, tens of thousands of embryos are frozen each year.3
Unfortunately, the current divorce rate in the United States exceeds 50 percent, and infertile 
couples are as prone to divorce as the rest of the population.4 Problems therefore arise as to the 
disposition of the cryogenically preserved embryos after a couple divorces and the propensity for 
divorce means that more and more couples each year end up in custody disputes over their frozen 
embryos.5 The issue of which individual should get custody of frozen embryos after divorce is 
significant because, “while such scientific advances promise extra opportunities for pregnancy, 
and thus increased hope for infertile [women], they also push the boundaries of law and ethics.”6
While some state courts have begun to tackle this issue,7 they failed to give adequate deference 
to the “sweat equity” of the female participant and misunderstood the role that these frozen 
embryos play in the infertile women’s ability to have a family, making it imperative that 
someone advocate on behalf of these women’s rights so that they can achieve motherhood.8
1 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 178 (N.Y. 1998). 
2 Cryopreservation is the “cooling of material, usually organisms or cells, to near or considerably below freezing 
temperatures.”  J.L. Hall & D. Engel, Applications of Cryopreservation in IVF/ET, in FOUNDATIONS OF IN VITRO 
FERTILIZATION: REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH  TECHNOLOGY 292 (Christopher M. Fredericks, John D. Paulson & Alan H. 
DeCherney eds., 1987). 
3 Id. 
4 Susan B. Apel, Esq., Disposition of Frozen Embryos: Are Contracts the Solution? 27 VER. B.J. & L. DIG. 29, 29 
(2001).  Infertile couples may be more prone to divorce because of the life stresses of trying to get pregnant.  
5 Id. 
6 Jennifer Marigliano Dehmal, Note and Comment, To Have or Not to Have: Whose Procreative Rights Prevail in 
Disputes Over Dispositions of Frozen Embryos?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1377 (1995). 
7 See infra Part II (discussing the courts that have attempted to settle the custody issues over frozen eggs). 
8 See infra Part III (arguing that courts should grant custody to the female IVF participant because of her sweat 
equity, and because the frozen embryos may present the only reasonable opportunity for her to have children). 
5This paper focuses on the struggles that infertile women face to achieve motherhood 
because their rights are underrepresented in the American court system.  It argues that the female 
participant deserves full custody of IVF produced cryogenically preserved embryos after a 
divorce, because it is the only feasible way for her to overcome her disability of infertility and 
conceive children who are genetically related to her.   Part I first explains the detailed process 
and technique of IVF that helps women overcome their disability of infertility, including the 
various benefits and risks that the women face.  Next, Part II analyzes the case law on this topic 
and explains the holdings and reasonings of the courts that have already tackled this issue and 
have failed to protect the infertile women’s rights.  Lastly, Part III explains why future decisions 
should grant custody of the cryogenically preserved embryos to women because of their “sweat 
equity” in the process9 and because these embryos provide the best chance for these infertile 
women to become mothers.10 
I. The Process and Risks of IVF 
 Until recently, sexual intercourse caused all human reproduction.11 However, advances 
in reproductive technology now enable women who otherwise could not conceive children to do 
so.12 Since 1978, when the first child conceived in a laboratory was born, researchers developed 
various techniques to help infertile couples create families.13 IVF, however, has been “by far the 
most visible, dramatic, and important assisted reproductive technique.”14 While physicians 
initially utilized IVF as a method of bypassing blocked fallopian tubes, it now represents “the 
 
9 See infra Part III.A; See also John Robertson, Resolving Disputes over Frozen Embryos, 19 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 7
(1989) (first applying the “sweat equity” theory to the IVF process).   
10 See infra Part III.B. 
11JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 3-8 (Princeton University Press) (1994).  
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 4. 
14 Id. at 8. 
6final common path for the treatment of infertility.”15 This Part details the steps that occur during 
the IVF process, and describes the various risks that female participants face when participating 
in the IVF process.  
 A. An Overview of IVF 
 The IVF process takes approximately two weeks and consists of four stages: ovulation 
induction, egg retrieval, fertilization, and egg transfer.16 During the first stage, ovulation 
induction, the female takes a grouping of different hormones that stimulate her ovaries to 
produce ‘two, three, four or more eggs’ and physicians closely monitor her to ensure that her 
body reacts correctly to the hormone induction.17 Physicians or IVF centers normally only 
perform surgery to remove the follicles if the female produces two or three follicles of at least 
three centimeters in diameter.18 A technician views these follicles via an ultrasound machine for 
the days preceding the female’s expected surgery.19 In order to enable the technician to see the 
ovaries, the female must drink thirty ounces of liquid forty-five minutes before the ultrasound to 
create a full bladder, which pushes the bowels out of the line of sight.20 The technician then 
coats the female’s stomach with a cool, blue liquid and moves a transducer across this liquid to 
locate the follicles on a screen.21 If the technician locates two to three follicles of proper 
diameter, he then injects a hormone called human chorionic gonadatrophin into the female, 
which stimulates ovulation to occur approximately thirty-six hours later.22 The injection is timed 
 
15 Sam Thatcher & Alan DeCherney, Pregnancy-Inducing Technologies: Biological and Medical Implications, in 
WOMEN & NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 27 (Judith Rodin & Aila Collins eds., 1991). 
16 ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 147-51 (Columbia University Press) (1989). 
17 Id. at 147. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
7so that the next surgery takes place after the female’s eggs have ripened to a stage of maturation 
that signals their readiness for fertilization, but before the female’s eggs are released.23 
During the second phase, egg retrieval, the physician retrieves the female’s matured eggs 
through a surgical procedure called laparoscopy, which physicians can perform after giving the 
woman only a light general anesthetic to protect the eggs.24 During laparoscopy, a surgeon 
makes three one-half inch incisions in the abdomen of the female.25 In one incision, he inserts a 
forceps to locate the ovaries, holds the ovaries steady, and moves anything aside that blocks the 
ovaries.26 In the second incision, he inserts a hollow needle, approximately 0.9 millimeters in 
diameter, “through which the follicular fluid will be suctioned.”27 Next, the physician pumps 
carbon dioxide gas into the female’s abdomen to increase visibility and make more room for the 
surgeon to work.28 In the third incision, the surgeon inserts the laparoscope, a thin instrument 
“‘about as big as a fountain pen and twice as long’ [which] literally translates from the Greek to 
mean ‘look into the abdomen.’”29 The laparoscope is equipped with a light, has a lens at the end, 
and acts like a telescope for the surgeon.30 The surgeon then locates the follicles, suctions them 
out with a foot-controlled vacuum pump, aspirates the follicle’s fluid, and places it directly into a 
 
23 Id. at 148.  This stage of maturation is known as metaphase II.  Id. 
24 Id. It has become increasingly more common to replace the laparoscopy procedure with an aspiration procedure 
that a physician conducts in his office and monitors through ultrasound.  Id.  The physician can place the suctioning 
needle into the abdomen, the bladder, or through the female’s vagina.  Id. at 149.   This process does not require 
general anesthesia and is less expensive than laparoscopy. Thatcher, supra note 15 at 31.  Some patients require 
laparoscopy because of the position of the uterus, while others require transvaginal capture because laparoscopy is 
impossible due to inaccessibility of ovaries with adhesions.  Id.  
25 BONNIKSEN, supra note 16 at 148. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. This needle has a Teflon lining to ensure that neither the fluid nor the eggs will attach to the needle during the 
suctioning process.  Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
8test tube.31 The surgeon then repeats the procedure several times to ensure that he has retrieved 
all of the eggs.32 
Next, the physician takes the test tubes to the laboratory where technicians examine the 
fluid for eggs.33 If the technician finds eggs in the fluid, the male must produce a sperm sample 
through the process of masturbation.34 After the male produces the semen, the technician 
separates the sperm from the seminal fluid, while the female’s eggs are maturing.35 The 
technician uses approximately 50,000 to 100,000 sperm for the fertilization procedure.36 
During the fertilization procedure, the third stage, the technician places each of the 
female’s eggs in a glass dish and combines them with some of the male’s sperm.37 The 
technicians carefully monitor the process to ensure that the type of dish reacts well with the 
sperm.38 If a negative reaction occurs, the technician must use a different type of dish.39 The 
technicians then place the filled dishes into an incubator with a temperature and moisture level 
similar to that of the woman’s fallopian tubes.40 If a sperm enters the egg, the egg forms a 
barrier that prevents the entry of another sperm.41 The egg then begins to change in composition, 
and starts to divide eighteen hours after fertilization.42 Most IVF centers transfer the embryos43 
to the woman’s uterus after the embryos have divided into two to eight cells.44 
31 Id. at 148-49. 
32 Id. at 149. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. Because sperm can lose potency with repeated ejaculations, the male is asked to resist ejaculation in the days 
preceding a laparoscope procedure. 
35 Id. at 150. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. The egg stays at the bottom of the dish where the sperm are drawn to it by gravity.  Id. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 There are several terms used in the literature, including “embryo,” “pre-embryo,” “zygote,” and “pre-zygote” to 
describe the product that occurs when the sperm fertilizes the egg during the third stage of IVF.  However, this paper 
9Technically, the transfer procedure, the fourth stage, represents the easiest step in the IVF 
process.45 In order to transfer the embryos, the woman lies on a table either on her back or facing 
down with her knees pulled into her chest, depending upon the tilt of her uterus.46 The 
embryologist loads the embryos and a small amount of medium into a catheter, and the physician 
then inserts the catheter into the woman’s vagina, through her cervix, and releases the embryos.47 
He then examines the catheter under a microscope to make sure that he released all of the 
embryos.48 If he did not release all of the embryos, then he repeats the procedure.  This 
procedure is generally painless for the woman and therefore does not require anesthesia.49 The 
woman then rests in a recovery room for approximately six to eight hours and later goes home 
for two to three days of strict bed rest.50 A physician or laboratory technician tests her blood two 
weeks after the procedure to determine if she is pregnant.51 This procedure determines whether 
she is chemically pregnant, and if a fetus appears on an ultrasound twelve weeks after the 
transfer procedure, she is considered clinically pregnant.52 While the process usually takes a 
total of two weeks, only the female participant must be present for appointments and procedures 
for that length of time.53 The female must visit the center or physician’s office for blood tests, 
injections, and repeat ultrasounds for the period of days or weeks before the anticipated egg 
collection procedure.54 In addition, for the procedures to occur, the female must be present for 
 
utilizes the term “embryo,” the most commonly used term, when referring to this product that the couple either 
utilizes or cryogenically preserves for later transfer procedures.  
44 THATCHER, supra note 15 at 32. 
45 Id. 
46 BONNIKSEN, supra note 16 at 151. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 THATCHER, supra note 15 at 33. 
50 BONNIKSEN, supra note 16 at 151 
51 Id. The physicians will only do so if the woman has not menstruated.  Id.  
52 Id.  
53 IVF website, Risks of Treatment, at http://www.ivf.com/overview.html. 
54 Id. 
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the egg collection and embryo transfer.55 However, the male participant must only be present at 
the time of his expected sperm donation.56 
Because couples gain no advantage when a physician transfers more than four embryos 
during a single cycle, couples who produced four or more embryos must decide what to do with 
the remaining embryos.57 Couples choose from several options.  First, they may choose to freeze 
the remaining embryos so that they may use them in future IVF cycles, if necessary.58 Recent 
advances have made the cryopreservation of embryos both feasible and practical.59 Second, the 
couple can anonymously donate the embryos for use by another infertile couple.60 Lastly, the 
couple may allow the embryos to develop in the laboratory until they perish, which usually takes 
about six to eight days, at which point the laboratory disposes of them.61 
B. Potential Risks that the Female Participant Faces During the IVF Procedure 
 While IVF has the benefit of allowing an infertile individual or infertile couple to 
conceive, it also carries many serious risks for the female.62 For example, the combination of 
hormones that a woman takes to stimulate ovary production in the first stage can result in allergic 
reactions or hyperstimulation of the ovaries, and she can experience bruising, swelling, 
tenderness, or infections at the injection site.63 One to two percent of women who undergo ovary 
hyperstimulation suffer from ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, which is a severe condition 
 
55 Id. 
56 Id. Men can certainly accompany the women throughout the process for support if they choose to do so.   
57 THATCHER, supra note 15 at 34.  Because the process carries risks and is costly, women want to minimize the 
amount of aspirations.  As a result, physicians remove many eggs during the aspiration process and release them into 
the women’s vagina in subsequent transfer procedures.  
58 IVF website, overview, at http://www.ivf.com/overview.html. 
59 THATCHER, supra 15 at 34. 
60 IVF website, overview, at http://www.ivf.com/overview.html. 
61 Id. 
62 IVF also carries serious risks for the baby.  However, these risks are not within the scope of this paper. 
63 IVF website, Risks of Treatment, at http://www.ivf.com/overview.html.  While lesser impositions, because the 
hormones cause the female’s estrogen levels to become elevated, they may also experience side effects including, 
but not limited to, fluid retention with slight weight gain, nausea, diarrhea, pelvic discomfort, breast tenderness, 
mood swings, headache, and fatigue. Id. 
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that can lead to breathing difficulties, temporary cessation of kidney function, and arterial and 
venous thrombosis.64 Additionally, a woman receiving the human chorionic gonadatrophin 
hormone can experience several serious complications including: excessive fluid retention 
leading to fluid in the abdomen and/or chest cavity, thrombosis (formation of blood clots) of her 
arteries and/or veins which may lead to a stroke, embolism, or potentially fatal complications, or 
abnormally enlarged ovaries, which can rupture or twist causing a surgical emergency.65 Any of 
these problems would likely require a prolonged hospitalization stay.66 Lastly, exposure to these 
hormones may also lead to slightly increased risks of breast cancer.67 
During the egg retrieval stage, the female also subjects herself to possible risks.  These 
risks include potential reactions from the drugs and procedures used to administer the anesthesia, 
reactions from the anesthesia itself, which includes death, and the risks associated with the 
laparoscope procedure of the passage of the needle through the vagina into the ovaries.68 These 
risks can include infection, bleeding, inadvertent damage to the structures near the ovaries 
including the bowel, bladder, blood vessels, ureter, uterus, ovaries, or stomach, and/or internal 
scarring following the procedure.69 While rare, some infections may become severe enough to 
require that the woman undergo a hysterectomy and/or removal of one or both of her ovaries.70 
Conversely, no serious risks exist during the egg fertilization stage because, aside from 
the production of sperm, the remainder of this process occurs in a laboratory.71 However, 
because the female remains on progesterone and other hormones to prepare her body for 
 
64 Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of “Coerced Parenthood” in Frozen Embryo Disputes, 
53 AM. U.L. REV. 1021, 1053 (2004). 
65 IVF website, Risks of Treatment, at http://www.ivf.com/overview.html. 
66 Id. 
67 Waldman, supra note 64 at 1053. 
68 IVF website, Risks of Treatment, at http://www.ivf.com/overview.html. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71Id. 
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implantation, she may experience side effects including vaginal dryness, breast tenderness, mood 
swings, bloating, and depression.72 
Lastly, embryo transfer is usually a painless procedure but can also result in some side 
effects and risks.  For example, the embryo transfer may cause the female to experience some 
mild cramping, bleeding, or infection.73 While unlikely, during the embryo transfer the eggs 
may be displaced in the cervix, resulting in the loss of the embryo, or within the fallopian tubes, 
resulting in a tubal pregnancy.74 
As this Part demonstrates, IVF is an advanced scientific procedure that takes about two 
weeks and ultimately enables infertile couples to reproduce.   While IVF has proved to be 
miraculous for thousands of couples, it also involves many serious risks for the female.  Because 
couples choose to cryogenically preserve their unused embryos, issues arise as to whom these 
embryos belong after a divorce.  Some courts have attempted to solve this issue, as explained 
below. 
II. Current Standards for Settling Custody Disputes over Cryogenically Preserved 
Embryos 
 Couples participating in the IVF process must often decide what to do with their 
remaining embryos.  Couples often choose to cryogenically preserve their embryos for their own 
future use since IVF is a very expensive, involved scientific procedure, and does not always 
result in pregnancy.  Because these embryos exist, conflicts often arise over them after a couple 
divorces.  Since 1992, four state courts have grappled to decide which parent should get custody 
 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 IVF website, Risks of Treatment, at http://www.ivf.com/overview.html. 
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over the frozen embryos after unforeseen circumstances occur, such as divorce.75 This Part 
analyzes the existing holdings and reasonings of the limited existing case law on this topic. 
A. Protecting the Rights of the Party Wishing to Avoid Procreation 
In 1992, in Davis v. Davis,76 the Tennessee Supreme Court became the first court to 
decide the disposition of a divorcing couple’s cryogenically preserved embryos.77 In Davis, 
Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis married and attempted to start a family.78 Unfortunately, 
Mary Sue Davis suffered five tubal pregnancies, resulting in the removal of her right fallopian 
tube and ligation of her left, eliminating the possibility of her naturally conceiving a child.79 
After unsuccessful attempts at adoption, the Davises determined that IVF was their only option 
for becoming parents.80 After several failed attempts, the Davises decided to wait until their 
clinic offered them cryogenic preservation so that they could freeze their remaining embryos and 
implant them into Mary Sue during later rounds of IVF.81 Once the clinic had the capability of 
freezing embryos, the Davises underwent another round of IVF and Mary Sue’s gynecologist 
was able to retrieve nine ova for fertilization, which were then fertilized in a Petri dish.82 The 
physician implanted two of these embryos into Mary Sue and cryogenically preserved the other 
seven.83 Unfortunately, neither of the two embryos implanted and Junior Davis filed for divorce 
before the Davises could undergo another round of IVF using the cryogenically preserved 
 
75 These courts include the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the Court of Appeals of New York, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey.  While the Court of Appeals of Washington heard a 
similar case involving the disposition of pre-embryos after divorce, Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086 (Wash. 
2000), this case will not be discussed as it also involves a surrogate mother, which does not fall within the realm of 
analysis that this paper intends to cover. 
76 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
77 Id. at 589-90. 
78 Id. at 591. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 591. 
81 Id. at 592. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
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embryos.84 Initially upon divorce, Mary Sue wanted custody of the embryos for use in future 
rounds of IVF, while Junior wanted the embryos destroyed.85 However, by the time the case 
reached the Tennessee Supreme Court, Mary Sue decided instead that she wanted to donate the 
embryos to another infertile couple.86 
Because this case was one of first impression, the court determined that it must address 
several important issues regarding IVF.  In its analysis, the court examined whether the embryos 
were to be considered “persons” or “property” under Tennessee and Federal law.87 The court 
adopted an intermediate view and determined that “[embryos] are not…either ‘persons’ or 
‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their 
potential for human life.”88 The court next examined whether the Davises could have decided 
the fate of the embryos by contract at the time of the procedures and decided that such an 
agreement should “be presumed valid and should be enforced as between the progenitors” when 
unexpected circumstances arise.89 
The court determined that in order to establish the disposition of the embryos, it must 
balance the rights of Mary Sue and Junior Davis against each other,90 reasoning that under 
federal law “the right of procreation is a vital part of an individual’s right to privacy… and that 
however far the protection of procreational autonomy extends, the existence of the right itself 
 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 601-02. 
86 Id. at 602. 
87 Id. The court examined the state’s Wrongful Death Statute, TENN. CODE. ANN., § 20-5-106, and cited Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) to come to its conclusion that the embryos could not be considered persons.  The court 
heard expert testimony to decide whether to call the fertilized products of IVF, “pre-embryos” or “embryos,” and 
decided that they were pre-embryos since that term applied until fourteen days after fertilization.  Id. at 593. 
88 Id. at 597. 
89 Id.  The court determined that such circumstances include death of one or more of the parties, divorce, financial 
reversals, or abandonment of the program.  Id. 
90 Id. at 602. 
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dictates that decisional authority rests in the gamete-providers alone….”91 It further stated that 
since the state’s interests do not become sufficiently compelling until after the first trimester has 
passed, there is no state interest that could possibly exist to overcome the interest of the gamete-
providers in the IVF context.92 As a result, the court determined that Junior’s interest in not 
becoming a father outweighed Mary Sue’s interest in donating the embryos to another couple so 
that her participation in the IVF procedures were not futile, and therefore determined that the 
embryos should be destroyed.93 The court did add, however, that the case would be much closer 
if Mary Sue had wanted to use the embryos for herself, but only if she could not “achieve 
parenthood by any other reasonable means.”94 The court stated that if that were the case, then 
the argument in favor of using the embryos in order for the mother to get pregnant should be 
considered.95 
Similarly, J.B. v. M.B.96 involved a divorced couple who disagreed about the disposition 
of seven embryos that were cryogenically preserved after the couple underwent IVF 
procedures.97 In J.B., a married couple could not conceive naturally because the woman was 
infertile, and therefore attempted IVF treatments.98 Before undergoing IVF, the couple signed 
numerous consent forms, one of which stated that the couple agreed to relinquish all “control, 
direction, and ownership of our tissues under the following circumstances [including] a 
dissolution of our marriage by court order, unless the court specifies who takes control and 
direction of the tissues…”99 The IVF procedure produced eleven embryos; the physicians 
 
91 Id. at 600-01. 
92 Id. at 602. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 709. 
99 Id. at 710. 
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implanted four into J.B., and cryogenically froze the remaining seven.100 J.B. conceived and 
subsequently gave birth to a daughter.101 Six months later, the couple separated and J.B. told 
M.B. that she wanted to have the remaining embryos discarded.102 M.B. disagreed.103 J.B. 
subsequently filed for divorce and sought a court order over the cryogenically preserved 
embryos, to which her husband filed a counterclaim compelling his wife to allow the embryos to 
be implanted or donated to other infertile couples.104 
In its analysis, the highest court of New Jersey, the Supreme Court, examined the 
couple’s consent forms and determined that they did not manifest a clear intent by either party 
regarding the disposition of the frozen embryos in the event of ‘dissolution of their marriage,’ 
since it allowed for an exception that permitted them to obtain a court order to direct the 
embryos’ disposition.105 The court stated that because J.B. and M.B. did not enter into a contract 
regarding the disposition of their cryogenically preserved embryos, it would have to consider 
each of the parties’ interests regarding procreation.106 It then explicitly agreed with the Davis 
court and stated that “‘ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail.’”107 The 
court determined that M.B.’s right to procreate is not denied if he is unable to use or donate the 
embryos since he is fertile and can procreate naturally.108 On the contrary, it stated that J.B.’s 
right not to procreate would be violated if she was forced to implant the embryos or allow 
someone else to use them.109 The court added that it would not force J.B. to become a parent 
against her will and concluded that the embryos were to be destroyed, unless J.B. did not object 
 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 714.  The court explicitly noted that the consent form was in sharp contrast to that in Kass, infra. Id. 
106 Id. at 715-16. 
107 Id. at 716 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992)). 
108 Id. at 717. 
109 Id. 
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to their continued storage at M.B.’s expense.110 Both the Davis and J.B. courts therefore 
protected the rights of the party wishing to avoid procreation so as to not compel a party to 
parent a child against his will. 
 B. Upholding Agreements Entered into during the IVF Procedure 
 Six years after Davis in Kass v. Kass,111 the Court of Appeals of New York similarly 
attempted to determine the proper disposition of five embryos112 frozen by a couple while they 
were married, but who had since divorced.113 In Kass, Maureen and Steven Kass were married 
and tried to conceive children, but were unable to do so naturally because of Maureen’s prenatal 
exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES).114 After artificial insemination procedures proved 
unsuccessful, the couple decided to enroll in a hospital’s IVF program.115 Over the course of 
five rounds of IVF, Maureen became pregnant twice; one resulted in a miscarriage, and the other 
resulted in an ectopic pregnancy that required surgical termination.116 Before their final 
procedure and before they chose to cryogenically preserve the remaining embryos, both Maureen 
and Steven signed consent forms detailing the manner in which they would use any remaining 
embryos.117 The forms, in part, stated that in the event of a divorce, the couple agreed that legal 
ownership of the cryogenically preserved embryos had to be determined in a property settlement 
in a court of proper jurisdiction.118 In addition, the couple signed a form that stated, “in the event 
that we no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy or are unable to make a decision regarding the 
disposition of our stored, frozen [embryos], we now indicate [that]…our frozen [embryos] may 
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be examined by the IVF Program for biological studies and be disposed of by the IVF Program 
for approved research investigation as determined by the IVF Program.”119 Three weeks later, 
after preserving five embryos, the couples signed a divorce agreement that also included the 
following statement: “the disposition of the frozen [five embryos] at Mather Hospital is that they 
should be disposed of in the manner outlined in our consent form and that neither Maureen Kass, 
Steve Kass or anyone else will lay claim to custody of these [embryos].”120 However, three 
weeks after signing the divorce decree, Maureen wrote a letter to the hospital and her IVF 
physician informing them that she and Steven were divorcing, but that she was in opposition to 
the destruction or release of her embryos since she wanted to use them in future rounds of 
IVF.121 
In its analysis, the trial court, the Supreme Court of New York, granted custody of the 
embryos to Maureen and directed her to “exercise her right to implant them within a medically 
reasonable time.”122 The court reasoned that the female IVF participant has exclusive decision 
making power over the embryos, in the same manner as a pregnant woman has the exclusive 
control over the nonviable fetus inside of her.123 The court also added that Maureen did not 
waive this right in any of the agreements that she signed.124 The appellate court reversed, 
reasoning that women’s rights to privacy and bodily integrity are not implicated prior to the 
implantation of the embryos, and that when the couple has agreed to the disposition of the 
embryos, that agreement should control.125 The court could not determine, however, whether the 
current agreement was dispositive of Maureen and Steven’s intentions, such that it should 
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control.126 Affirming, New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals of New York, concluded 
that the parties clearly expressed their intent to have the embryos donated to the IVF program in 
the event of a divorce.127 Drawing upon Davis, the court stated that “agreements between 
progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding disposition of their [embryos] should generally be 
presumed valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them.”128 The court also 
stated that agreements made before the fact would be futile if courts enforced them only to the 
extent that the contracting parties continued to agree.129 As such, the court concluded that the 
parties manifested their intent when they signed the consent forms and that the embryos would 
therefore be donated to the IVF program as they had originally agreed.130 
C. Refusing to Uphold an IVF Agreement since it would Compel a Party to become 
a Parent against His Will 
 In A.Z. v. B.Z.,131 the highest court of Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court, 
attempted to answer the same question as the courts in Davis and Kass.  As in the above cases, 
A.Z. involved a couple who suffered complications when trying to conceive naturally and 
therefore decided to undergo IVF treatment.132 Unlike the other cases, the wife in A.Z. 
successfully became pregnant via IVF and gave birth to twin daughters in 1992.133 Before this 
conception, the couple cryogenically froze two vials of embryos for future implantation.134 
Before each round of IVF, the couple signed several consent forms.135 On each form, the wife 
specified that the embryos were to be returned to her for implantation in the event that she and 
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her husband separated.136 In 1995, the wife desired more children and had a lab implant one 
embryo from the frozen vials, without informing her husband.137 No pregnancy resulted from 
this implantation and relations between the husband and wife deteriorated.138 The wife received 
a protective order against her husband, after which the couple separated and ultimately 
divorced.139 
In its analysis, the court determined that the consent forms in which the wife specified 
that the embryos should be returned to her upon a separation from her husband were 
unenforceable for several reasons.140 First, the court decided that the form was only intended to 
define the donors’ relationship as a unit with the clinic and not as a binding agreement in the 
event that the couple later disagreed as to the disposition of the embryos, and nor did the couple 
intend it to.141 Second, because the consent form did not specify an expiration date, the court 
could not infer that the couples intended the agreement to govern four years after its execution.142 
Third, the court decided that since the form used the words “should we become separated” 
without defining “become separated,” it could not conclude that the form governed in the event 
of a divorce since separation and divorce have significantly different legal meanings.143 Thus, the 
court determined that it could not enforce the couple’s agreement and noted that the agreement 
violated public policy by compelling a donor to become a parent against his will.144 As such, the 
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court did not uphold the agreement, and did not award custody of the embryos to the wife, in 
order to prevent the husband from fathering a child against his will.145 
The holdings of these cases have been very similar.  All of the courts stated that a 
couple’s agreement, made before a divorce, but with regards to the event of divorce, should be 
upheld, so long as it does not compel one of the parties to become a parent against his or her will.  
In the absence of such an agreement, and if the parties cannot agree, the courts agreed that the 
right of the party who desires not to procreate should supercede the right of the party who wishes 
to use the embryos for procreation, so long as the party wishing to procreate can do so by other 
reasonable means.  Because IVF is becoming increasingly popular, the courts of the forty-six 
other states will likely answer similar questions in the future. 
III. The Decisions Fail to Accord Adequate Weight to the Infertile Women’s Rights  
 While the highest courts of only four states attempted to determine which party should 
have custody of cryogenically preserved embryos after they divorce, all four of those courts 
failed to adequately account for the female IVF participant’s rights.146 Instead, the courts 
examined whether the parties signed a contract, and then either ignored the contractual terms that 
favored procreation because of public policy, or “contort[ed] existing language to dictate embryo 
destruction.”147 If no contract existed, the courts paid “lip service to an individual’s interest in 
procreation,” but consistently held that the interest was superceded by the right not to 
procreate.148 As such, the courts did not give adequate deference to the process and risks that the 
female was subjected to as a participant in the IVF process, her “sweat equity,” and in balancing 
the rights of the parties, failed to recognize the substantial investments that female participants 
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have in the existing embryos.  This Part explains why the courts should have granted custody of 
the frozen embryos to the female IVF participants and demonstrates the importance of 
representing these rights in future decisions. 
 A. Courts Should Give More Deference to the “Sweat Equity” Theory 
The first reason that courts should favor the female IVF participant’s rights over the male 
participant’s rights is grounded in the “sweat equity” theory.   When applied to the IVF context, 
the “sweat equity” theory stands for the proposition that the female gamete provider should 
always retain custody of the cryogenically preserved embryos after a divorce because of her 
greater physical contribution during the process of IVF.149 
While the IVF process requires a contribution from both the male and female participant, 
the female’s contribution involves far more “sweat equity than the male’s contribution.”150 For 
the female participant, IVF treatment is an incredibly onerous and invasive process that threatens 
her health.151 The female participant reports to an IVF center or physician’s office for blood 
tests, injections, and repeat ultrasounds for the period of days or weeks before the anticipated egg 
collection procedure and she is both physically and emotionally involved for the entire two week 
period.152 During that period, she submits to hormone injections, ultrasounds, laparoscopic 
surgery or transvaginal aspiration, the embryo transfer procedure, bed rest, and intense 
monitoring.153 In addition, by participating in the IVF process, the woman faces several risks that 
include bleeding, infection, temporary kidney non-function, breathing difficulties, stroke, 
embolism, arterial thrombosis, increased risk of breast cancer, and even death.154 While less 
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severe, women also experience vaginal dryness, breast tenderness, mood swings, bloating, 
depression, weight gain, nausea, diarrhea, pelvic discomfort, headaches, and fatigue.155 
On the contrary, the IVF process for the male participant does not threaten his health, is 
easy and not invasive, and only requires that he be present for the short amount of time that it 
takes for him to produce a semen sample.156 This semen sample is the male participant’s only 
requirement and can be achieved without any highly technical interventions.157 To make his 
contribution to the IVF process, the male participant simply needs “a private room, an empty jar 
and, perhaps, a Playboy magazine or video.”158 This process also does not subject the male 
participant to any risks.159 
Under the “sweat equity” theory, the female should always prevail, regardless of whether 
she seeks the right to procreate or the right to not procreate.160 As a result of the great disparity 
between the genders as to the amount of work and risk involved in the IVF process, the female 
should have the right to determine the fate of the embryos that resulted from the physical pain 
that she endured and risks that she took in order to undergo IVF.161 While the male participants 
may argue that they are equally as emotionally involved in the process as the female participants, 
the male participants do not endure any physical pain or subject themselves to any risks and 
therefore should not prevail.162 
While the female’s “sweat equity” is incredibly important and should be considered when 
weighing the rights of each party, only one court mentioned the “sweat equity” theory when 
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attempting to determine the disposition of the frozen embryos.  In its analysis, the Davis court 
mentioned the “sweat equity” theory as one possible model for it to adopt, but then merely 
dismissed it without any real analysis.163 The Kass and A.Z. courts failed to even make mention 
of this model and therefore blatantly disregarded the female’s physical and emotional efforts, and 
the risks that she exposed herself to in an effort to conceive a child.164 In doing so, these courts 
essentially compelled the female participants to again endure the emotional, physical, and 
financial hardships that accompany IVF, if they decided to conceive children in the future. 
 As a result of the emotional and physical contribution that the female participant makes 
when she undergoes IVF treatment, courts should grant full power to the female to determine the 
disposition of the cryogenically preserved embryos, to recognize her efforts and prevent her from 
being subjected to the same risks again in the future.  The woman makes a greater investment in 
creating the embryos and should therefore be afforded the right to decide their disposition.165 
B. Courts should Find that the Female’s Desire to Procreate Should Supercede the 
Male’s Desire not to Procreate 
In addition to the “sweat equity” theory, courts should especially grant custody of the 
cryogenically preserved embryos to the female participant when she wishes to utilize the 
embryos in future rounds of IVF to conceive children.   Unfortunately, none of the cases 
acknowledged the fact that the cryogenically preserved embryos may have provided the only 
means for the women to conceive children, and therefore stripped the women of their ability to 
become mothers. 
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 Couples will usually only turn to IVF if they cannot conceive naturally without it.166 For 
example, Mary Sue Davis suffered five tubal pregnancies and ligation of both fallopian tubes 
before turning to IVF,167 Maureen Kass was infertile because of prenatal exposure to DES,168 
B.Z. suffered an ectopic pregnancy that resulted in the removal of one of her fallopian tubes,169 
and J.B. developed a condition that prevented her from conceiving.170 However, the Davis court 
stated that the female’s right to procreate did not supercede the male’s right to procreate because 
the female could undergo another round of IVF or could adopt.171 The court based its decision 
on the fact that Mary Sue Davis was asking the court to allow her to donate the embryos to 
another infertile couple instead of implanting them herself, and noted that the “case would be 
closer if Mary Sue Davis were seeking to use the [embryos] herself, but only if she could not 
achieve parenthood by any other reasonable means.”172 However, the court then added that this 
was not the case since Mary Sue would have a reasonable opportunity to achieve parenthood 
through another attempt at IVF or through adoption.173 The Kass appellate court also suggested 
that the party seeking to avoid procreation should prevail because the other spouse could achieve 
parenthood through reasonable alternate routes including adoption instead of embryo 
implantation.174 
The problem with these courts’ determinations that the female IVF participants can 
achieve motherhood through other means is that IVF and adoption are not always reasonable or 
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feasible options for many women.    First, IVF success declines as the female’s age increases.175 
For women, “age is the enemy of fertility [as] women hit their reproductive prime in their early 
twenties [and] each advancing year represents a slight decline in the ability to conceive and carry 
a child.”176 Once a woman turns thirty-five, her chances of conceiving, and her chances of 
miscarrying, increase exponentially each year.177 In addition, women experience a decrease in 
both egg number and egg quality as they become older, which lessens their chances of 
conceiving through IVF.178 Furthermore, a woman’s age is the most important factor affecting 
her chances of a live birth as women over the age of thirty-five are less likely to respond to ovary 
stimulation and to produce the quality of eggs needed for retrieval.179 The eggs actually 
retrieved from older women are then less likely to survive the processes of fertilization, egg 
transfer, and implantation.180 As a result, these statistics demonstrate that the already preserved 
embryos have a much greater chance of resulting in a live birth than any future eggs will have, 
and often represent the woman’s only chance of naturally conceiving and birthing a child.  As a 
result, the courts’ determinations that the female IVF participants did not need the frozen 
embryos to achieve motherhood were misinformed. 
 The second issue with the courts’ argument that the females could achieve motherhood 
through other means is that adoption is not always feasible and “the courts’ cavalier inclusion of 
adoption as a reasonable means to embryo implantation ignores the difficulties facing older, 
single individuals who seek to adopt.”181 There are three ways to adopt a child – through public 
adoption, private adoption, or abroad, and none of them favor placing a child with a single 
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parent.182 Public adoption becomes especially problematic for women seeking Caucasian babies 
since when public adoption agencies have a healthy, Caucasian baby, they first seek to place the 
child with a married couple, and only consider placing the child with a single parent 
secondarily.183 Unfortunately, the demand for healthy, Caucasian babies far exceeds the supply, 
further limiting the chances of single, infertile women adopting.184 Some public agencies 
therefore only allow single parents to adopt physically or mentally handicapped children, older 
children, or children with behavioral issues.185 While these women can seek private agency 
adoption, the process can cost between $10,000 and $25,000 and carries with it the same issues 
as public adoption.186 Lastly, infertile single parents can attempt to adopt a child abroad but will 
often be required to retrieve the child in his or her country of origin, an incredibly difficult and 
expensive process.  In addition, the children will typically have spent several months in an 
orphanage receiving varying levels of quality and quantity of care, and “maternal malnutrition, 
drug or alcohol use, HIV status, and hepatitis all threaten the child’s long-term development.”187 
Unfortunately, adoption, especially for single, older women, “[is] an expensive process fraught 
with the potential for protracted delay and ultimate disappointment… [and] it is not a comparable 
alternative” to IVF conception.188 
The courts incorrectly assumed that the female participants could achieve pregnancy 
through other reasonable means since “achieving parenthood through additional [IVF] efforts or 
adoption is not likely to be easily accomplished, especially for frozen embryo disputants who are 
psychologically at risk for conception difficulties and whose status as an older divorcee will 
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complicate their adoption efforts.”189 As a result, future courts should combine the Davis court’s 
dicta that stated that Mary Sue’s case would be much closer if she wanted to use the embryos for 
future rounds of IVF and could not achieve motherhood through any other reasonable means, 
with the above arguments and should hold that the female’s desire to procreate supercedes the 
male’s desire to not procreate, since the Davis court based its dicta on the assumption that it was 
reasonable for Mary Sue Davis to undergo another round of IVF or to adopt.190 
Critics of this proposal will likely argue that it forces males to become fathers even if 
they have specifically stated that they would not have become fathers if they knew that divorce 
was imminent.  For example, the Davis court determined that Junior Davis could not be 
compelled to procreate after he explained to the court that he grew up in a divorced household 
and was “vehemently opposed to fathering a child that would not live with both parents.” 191 
While the court found this interest compelling, the argument lacks sufficient merit to supercede 
the rights of women who wish to procreate.  Junior Davis, and every other person who decides to 
parent a child, whether naturally, through IVF, or even through adoption, assumes the risk of that 
child growing up in a divorced or single child household.192 Married couples currently face a 
greater than 50% chance of divorce, and the possibility always exists that one of the parents will 
unexpectedly pass away, in both cases, leaving the children to grow up in a home with only one 
natural parent.193 Furthermore, Junior Davis consented to participating in the IVF process with 
his wife, and donated his sperm samples to fertilize the eggs in an effort to impregnate his wife, 
regardless of the fact that statistics showed he had a greater chance of divorcing his wife than 
 
189 Id. at 1054. 
190 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992). 
191 Id. 
192 See Apel, supra note 4 at 29 (stating that couples currently face a greater chance of divorcing than staying 
married). 
193 Id. 
29
staying married to her.194 If one of the eggs transferred into Mary Sue’s uterus successfully 
implanted, Junior Davis would have fathered a child who would not have lived with both 
parents, since they divorced shortly thereafter.  As a result, a male participant’s argument that he 
desires not to father a child that will grow up in a divorced household should not have enough 
merit to supercede the rights of a female wishing to use the fertilized embryos to procreate.   
 Male participants will likely argue that it is unfair for them to financially support a child 
that they did not wish to father.  However, in balancing the rights of each party, the courts will 
also have the ability to condition the grant of custody to the woman by explaining to her that the 
male participant will not be held responsible for support of any resulting children.  In doing so, 
the courts can balance the rights of each party, while accounting for the woman’s “sweat equity” 
and potential inability for her to achieve motherhood without the frozen embryos. 
IV. Conclusion 
 IVF fulfills the dreams of infertile women by enabling them to overcome their disability 
and have children to whom they are biologically related.   Additional technological 
advancements then permit these women and their husbands to cryogenically preserve unused 
embryos for implantation at a later date without undergoing the entire IVF process.     While 
these embryos help the couple conceive children, they also present a source of contention upon 
divorce.  Because the courts of only four states determined who gets custody of these embryos 
after a divorce, and because the divorce rate and the number of couples utilizing IVF are 
increasing, future states will likely answer the same question in the future.  Until now, the rights 
of female participants wishing to utilize the frozen embryos have not been adequately protected 
or recognized.  As a result, it is important that when future courts hear these cases, they 
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understand the effort and risks that the female participant subjects herself to during IVF, and that 
these embryos usually present the only chance, or at least the best chance, for these infertile 
women to conceive children in the future, so that they can properly give deference to the 
women’s rights and award custody of the embryos to the female participant.   
 
